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Abstract
Using monthly balance-sheet data of all major German credit banks, we analyze
deposit withdrawals and bank failures in the German banking and currency crisis of
1931. We ￿nd that deposit withdrawals were driven by the run on the currency, but
were also related to banks￿ liquidity positions; that branch banks were no more stable
than unit banks; and that large banks were privileged, being bailed out and receiving
preferential access to the discount window. These ￿ndings underline the importance
of liquidity and implicit guarantees in twin crises, while they question the bene￿ts of
branching in such crises. (JEL: G21, E5, N24, C34; Keywords: Twin crises,
liquidity, implicit guarantees, ￿too big to fail￿.)
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11 Introduction
The high incidence of ￿nancial crises in the past decades has inspired a large amount of
literature on the determinants of ￿nancial instabilities. One can distinguish two distinct
strands within that literature: The ￿rst one is concerned with the microeconomics of banking,
such as risk allocation and moral hazard, and its implications for banking stability and
regulation. The other strand deals with the macroeconomic aspects of ￿nancial crises, such
as the ￿rst- and second-generation models of currency crises. The severe crises of the 1990s
shifted the attention to ￿twin crises,￿ involving the simultaneous collapse of the currency
and the banking sector. These crises revealed the necessity of combining the two strands of
literature in order to understand the interactions between the micro- and the macroeconomic
factors in such crises.
This led to the emergence of the third-generation models of crises, which are dominated
by two ideas: The ￿rst is the role of moral hazard and implicit public guarantees in twin
crises, the other, the eﬀects of depreciations of the domestic currency on banks￿ balance
sheets. However, this literature is predominantly theoretical, whereas the empirics of twin
crises are still poorly understood. The most well-known empirical paper on twin crises is the
one by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). By analyzing the timing of banking and currency
crises across a large sample of countries, the authors establish a number of stylized facts
about twin crises. Their main results are that banking and currency crises became more
closely linked after the ￿nancial liberalization in the 1980s, and that banking crises typically
preceded currency crises. However, due to its high level of aggregation, the analysis cannot
tell us anything about the ￿microeconomics of twin crises.￿
This paper tries to ￿ll this gap by analyzing one particular crisis on the basis of individual
bank data, namely the German twin crisis of 1931. This crisis seems to be well-suited for the
study of the issues involved. First, the episode shares many features with the more recent
crises: The banks had accumulated large amounts of short-term foreign currency debt at
low interest rates. When capital ￿ows reversed abruptly, the banks faced serious liquidity
problems due to heavy deposit withdrawals, culminating in the collapse of the banks and
the ￿xed peg. However, the largest banks were bailed out by the government. This raises
the questions whether these banks were considered to be ￿too big to fail,￿ and what role
implicit guarantees played in the German crisis.1
1Implicit government guarantees have ￿gured prominently in the explanations of the more recent crises.
2Second, there exists monthly balance-sheet data of all major German credit banks.2 This
disaggregated data allows us to trace the relationship between the microeconomic behavior of
banks and the macroeconomic developments. By exploiting the heterogeneity across banks,
we can distinguish between competing explanations of twin crises. Most importantly, we ask
whether the run on German banks was caused by the run on the currency, or whether it was
driven by depositors who had doubts about their banks￿ soundness.
Third, the crisis took place in an environment where market discipline was not hampered
by an explicit deposit insurance scheme, or by the existence of an international institution
such as the International Monetary Fund. This fact allows us to isolate the eﬀects of domes-
tic implicit guarantees to the largest German banks by comparing their performance with
that of smaller banks. To our knowledge, our paper is the ￿rst to explicitly test for the
existence of implicit government guarantees in twin crises at a disaggregated level. Given
the strong emphasis on such guarantees in the third-generation crisis models, such evidence
is particularly important.
Finally, the German crisis allows us to examine the bene￿ts of branch networks in twin
crises because the banks in the sample diﬀer regarding the extent of their branch networks.
It is a widely maintained hypothesis that branch banks are more stable than non-branch
banks. The question is whether this claim is still true at times of severe macroeconomic
shocks, when there is not much to be gained from regional diversi￿cation.
Our analysis yields the following results: First, the run on the German currency trans-
lated into a run on banks; banks exhibited particularly high deposit withdrawals at times of
currency turmoil, especially if their shares of foreign deposits were high. However, deposit
withdrawals were also related to the banks￿ strength, in particular to their liquidity ratios.
This stresses the role of liquidity in twin crises. Taken together, these results indicate that
the banking and the currency crisis were superimposed upon, and presumably reinforced,
each other. This is consistent with Kaminsky and Reinhart￿s (1999) evidence of a vicious
spiral between the two phenomena. Second, there is no evidence that branch banks were
more stable than unit banks. Branch banks exhibited neither lower deposit withdrawals,
nor a lower probability of failure. This suggests that branch networks are of little help in
See, e.g., Krugman (1998) and Corsetti et al. (1999).
2This data has hardly been used. Most analyses of the German crisis are based on aggregate data. The
only other microeconometric study is by Petri (1998), who conducts a survival analysis of German banks.
3the presence of large macroeconomic shocks as are common in twin crises.3 Third, there is
strong evidence that large banks had a higher probability of survival and somewhat weaker
evidence that this translated into lower deposit withdrawals, controlling for the riskiness of
banks￿ portfolios. We also ￿nd that large banks were more likely to be bailed out and that
they received preferential access to the Reichsbank￿s discount window. This supports the
view that large banks were considered to be ￿too big to fail,￿ and underlines the importance
of implicit guarantees in twin crises.4
Our results can be compared with the small, but growing microeconometric literature
on the more recent twin crises, most notably on Argentina.5 Schumacher (2000) ￿nds that,
similar to our ￿ndings, in the Tequila crisis of 1994/95 ￿ which was not really a twin cri-
sis because the ￿x e dp e gd i dn o tc o l l a p s ei nt h ee n d￿t h er u no nb a n k sw a sr e l a t e dt o
individual banks￿ weaknesses, and was not just a consequence of the run on the currency.
However, liquidity factors appear to have played a much smaller role than in the German
crisis. In contrast, Burdisso and D￿Amato (2002) ￿nd for the 2001/02 crisis that deposit
withdrawals were not linked at all to individual banks￿ characteristics, but were rather driven
by macroeconomic shocks alone. However, this result may be driven by the fact that most
bank characteristics vary at a lower frequency than the macroeconomic variables used in the
regressions. None of these papers deals with the role of implicit government guarantees or
branching. However, Schumacher (2000) ￿nds that the explicit deposit insurance scheme
introduced in 1995 in Argentina deterred depositors from withdrawals.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we brie￿y describe the history of the
German crisis. Then we formulate the hypotheses that form the basis of our empirical
analysis. In section 4, we describe the dataset and its major properties. Sections 5 and 6
contain the two econometric parts: the ￿rst one analyzes deposit ￿ows, the second standby
activities. Section 7 concludes. The appendix contains a number of supplementary tables.
3Carlson (2004) ￿nds similar evidence for U.S. banks during the Great Depression. In fact, branch
banks are found to be less l i k e l yt os u r v i v ea n dt os u r v i v ef o rshorter periods of time. This contradicts the
conventional wisdom.
4Kryzanowski and Roberts (1993) document a similar phenomenon at Canadian banks in the same time
period. For the 1980s, Boyd and Gertler (1994) present evidence for a ￿too-big-to-fail￿ problem at U.S.
commercial banks with strikingly similar results to ours.
5Berlemann et al. (2002) analyze the Bulgarian twin crisis, but they do not use individual bank data.
42 History of the German crisis6
After Germany￿s return to the gold standard in 1923, the German banking sector experienced
a rapid expansion during the second half of the 1920s. Due to the scarcity of domestic savings,
this expansion was ￿nanced largely by foreign debt. In 1929, 18 percent of all deposits in
the banking sector were foreign, most of it short-term deposits. In 1928, foreign lending to
Germany started to decrease, and Germany experienced gold out￿ows from 1930 on. German
GDP growth slowed down substantially in 1928 and became negative in 1929, which was the
beginning of a deep recession with rapidly increasing unemployment, a dramatically shrinking
money supply, and tumbling prices.
Even before the crisis of 1931, there were several episodes of ￿nancial instability. Two
crises were related to political events, the ￿rst to the imminent breakdown of reparations
negotiations in the spring of 1929, the second to the governmental crisis in July 1930 and
particularly to the Reichstag elections in September 1930. The Reichsbank￿s gold cover and
bank deposits decreased substantially in these crises (￿gure 1), but there were no signi￿cant
number of bank failures. Another crisis was related to the breakdown of the second largest
German insurance company, FAVAG, in the fall of 1929. A number of banks failed in that
crisis, but there were hardly any macroeconomic repercussions.
The crisis of 1931 again took place in an environment of political disturbances, culminat-
ing in a memorandum of the Br￿ning government on June 6 stating that Germany was no
longer able or willing to bear the burden of reparations. At the same time, bad news from
the banking sector drew attention to the vulnerabilities of the banks. The publication of
huge losses at the largest Austrian bank, ￿￿sterreichische Creditanstalt,￿ on May 11 raised
fears of similar weaknesses in Germany due to the similarity between the Austrian and the
German banking systems. Then, about the time of the reparations memorandum, ￿rst ru-
mors about problems at the second largest German bank, Danatbank, started to spread.
A few days later, the information about disastrous losses at Nordwolle, a textile company,
began to circulate. This gave rise to further speculations about Nordwolle￿s major creditors,
Danatbank and Dresdner Bank, whose exposure to Nordwolle was substantial.




















































































































































Figure 1: The Reichsbank￿s gold cover and the evolution of total deposits. Notes: The gold cover
is de￿ned as the share of Reichsbank reserves in the Reichsbank note circulation (in percent, left
scale). Total deposits are deposits at monthly reporting credit banks, including acceptances (in
million Reichsmark, right scale). Gaps are due to missing data. The dashed line denotes the 40
percent mandatory gold cover under the gold standard.
Severe pressure on the currency and heavy deposit withdrawals accompanied these events
(￿gure 1), and the Reichsbank discounted large numbers of bills to keep the banking system
liquid. Due to continuing reserves losses, the Reichsbank felt impelled to tighten its liquidity
provision on July 10. This triggered the breakdown of Danatbank. A general banking panic
erupted as soon as the breakdown of Danatbank became public on July 13. The banking
system was temporarily suspended by the declaration of bank holidays. The banking panic
was accompanied by huge reserve losses at the Reichsbank, and the gold cover quickly fell
below the forty-percent minimum. On July 15, the Reichsbank suspended convertibility of
the Reichsmark into gold and imposed capital controls, which set an end to the gold standard
in Germany. The payments system operated on a restricted scale until the beginning of
August. Negotiations with foreign creditors resulted in a standstill agreement on part of the
international debt. Bank failures played only a minor role in the German crisis, as all of
the largest banks were saved by public capital injections. The crisis gave rise to national
banking supervision and to tightened banking regulation.
In summary, the German crisis displayed the same boom-and-bust cycle as the more
recent crises. The build-up of high levels of short-term foreign debt in the economy, and
6especially in the banking sector, was followed by a sudden capital reversal, which impaired
both the banking sector and the currency. After the crisis there were some major bail-outs
by the public authorities, suggesting the potential role of implicit government guarantees
in the crisis. Note, however, that there was no devaluation after the crisis, so the currency
crisis did not aﬀect banks through balance-sheet eﬀects.
3 Hypotheses
To structure the discussion, the analysis will be based on four hypotheses. All hypotheses
are complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. The currency-crisis hypothesis states
that the run on the currency translated into deposit withdrawals from banks. Under this hy-
pothesis, investors withdrew their bank deposits because they had doubts about Germany￿s
ability and willingness to service its foreign debt and about the stability of the currency.
Then we would expect deposit withdrawals to be particularly high at times of currency dis-
turbances. Moreover, withdrawals should be related to a bank￿s share of foreign deposits
because foreign depositors (mostly foreign banks in our case) are likely to react more strongly
than domestic depositors, who also need their deposits for transaction purposes.7
A c c o r d i n gt ot h ebanking-crisis hypothesis, depositors withdrew their funds from banks
that they considered to be weak. Then deposit withdrawals should be related to banks￿
(perceived) solvency or liquidity positions.8 It should be stressed that these two hypotheses
are not mutually exclusive. It is well possible that the causalities in twin crises go in both
directions, and that the two types of crises are superimposed upon, or even reinforce, each
other. For example, the withdrawals accompanying a run on the currency weaken banks￿
liquidity positions, which may induce further withdrawals from illiquid banks. Also, the run
on the currency may raise fears that certain banks become insolvent in case of devaluation,
7However, the same observation would also be consistent with the view that depositors considered banks
with high shares of foreign deposits to be particularly vulnerable to devaluation. Therefore, it does not allow
us to distinguish between the currency-crisis and the banking-crisis hypothesis.
8In the economic history literature, there is an active debate on whether the German crisis was a banking
or a currency crisis. See Hardach (1976), Balderston (1994), and Ferguson and Temin (2003) for the currency
view, and Born (1967) and James (1984) for the banking view. For a reconciliation of these two views, see
Schnabel (2004a) and the following discussion by Ferguson and Temin (2004) and Schnabel (2004b).
7triggering withdrawals from banks with high shares of foreign-currency deposits. Conversely,
deposits withdrawn from weak banks may be transferred abroad, putting pressure on the
currency.
The branching hypothesis claims that banks maintaining branch networks were more
stable than unit banks.9 Branch banks should be more diversi￿ed on both the asset and the
liabilities sides and should therefore be less vulnerable to local or regional shocks. Under
the branching hypothesis, banks maintaining branch networks are expected to display lower
deposit withdrawals and to have lower failure probabilities than unit banks. In order to
separate the eﬀects of branching and size, it is important to simultaneously include a measure
of size, such as total assets. Note that the rejection of the branching hypothesis does not
imply that branch networks never oﬀer any protection to banks. Instead, it would point
towards the lower bene￿ts of branch networks in crises that are driven by macroeconomic
shocks, as is the case in twin crises.
Finally, the too-big-to-fail hypothesis states that large banks were considered to be too
important to be allowed to fail. This hypothesis implies that large banks should be less
likely to fail, and more likely to be bailed out, than small banks (at a given portfolio risk).
If depositors anticipate the bail-outs of large banks, these banks should also display lower
deposit withdrawals, holding constant the riskiness of the banks￿ portfolios. Moreover, the
central bank may privilege large banks in the provision of liquidity. In a twin crisis with
sudden capital reversals, liquidity becomes an important determinant of banks￿ survival.
Therefore, the evidence on liquidity provision is particularly instructive.10
9The hypothesis that branch banking has a stabilizing eﬀect was ￿rst stated by Friedman and Schwartz
(1963, pp. 352). It was based on the experience from the Great Depression when the United States, a country
with severe branching restrictions, suﬀered much more from bank failures than Canada, where interstate
branching was permitted.
10We do not test directly for higher risk-taking at the large banks because many aspects of risk-taking
are diﬃcult to measure with balance-sheet data. Schnabel (2004a) presents some quantitative and anecdotal
evidence of excessive risk-taking at the largest banks in the German crisis.
84D a t a
4.1 Description of data sources11
Monthly balance sheets of German banks have been published in Deutscher Reichs- und
Preu￿ischer Staatsanzeiger since March 1928. Only publicly traded banks were required
to publish interim balance sheets. Many other banks published their balances voluntarily.
Our sample stretches from March 1928 till the end of 1932, shortly before the take-over of
power by Hitler. To avoid interference with the annual balances, no monthly balances were
provided for the months of December and January. Thus, our sample contains a total of 49
months with balance-sheet data. The high frequency of balances is a particularly attractive
property of the dataset, as it permits a detailed analysis of deposit ￿ows over time. Monthly
balances were ￿raw￿ balances, which means that earnings and losses were booked only once
a year. This raises measurement problems with respect to capital as well as to all items
that are subject to depreciation, such as loans and securities. In contrast, the distortions on
items like deposits or liquid assets should be negligible.
The sample contains 110 credit banks. The sample is highly unbalanced because only
50 of these banks published balance sheets in all months. With respect to total assets, the
sample comprises about one third of the German banking sector. However, the banks in
our sample were holding about 80 percent of the banking sector￿s aggregate foreign debt.12
Therefore, these banks are well-suited for the study of the dynamics of the twin crisis.
The balance-sheet data is supplemented by data from various sources. One variable of
major importance is banks￿ foreign debt, which cannot be inferred from monthly balance
sheets. However, monthly reporting banks had to report their levels of foreign debt con-
￿dentially to the Reichsbank on a quarterly basis. This data was never published, but it
partly exists in the Reichsbank￿s archival material in the Bundesarchiv in Berlin. While
the available information is not suﬃcient to construct time series for all the banks in our
11A detailed list of the descriptive statistics and sources of the variables used in the analysis can be found
in table A2 in the appendix.
12The sample excludes public banks, cooperative banks, private bankers, and smaller credit banks. Of
these, only the private bankers were holding signi￿cant amounts of foreign debt. However, the information
on them is very fragmentary, even at the aggregate level.
9sample, we were able to construct a measure of the level of foreign debt as of June 30, 1930.13
If the relative importance of withdrawals of domestic and foreign deposits was comparable
across banks, this measure should capture the cross-sectional diﬀerences in the vulnerability
of banks to short-term capital reversals reasonably well.14
Information on banks￿ failures and mergers as well as on public standby activities were
retrieved from the periodical Die Bank, which contains a detailed chronology of events in the
German banking sector. Data on the banks￿ branch networks is from Saling￿s B￿rsenpapiere
(1930). In addition to the data on individual banks, we collected a large number of national
and regional variables. For banks with national branch networks, we inserted the ￿gures for
the German Reich when using regional variables.
4.2 Descriptive analysis
4.2.1 Bank characteristics
Most of the 110 credit banks in our sample were universal banks. Only a small subset of 16
banks (15%) were specialized, mostly sector-speci￿c banks. The banks in our sample were
spread all over the German Reich. With respect to total assets, Berlin clearly stood out as
all six of the so-called ￿great banks￿ were based in Berlin. More than two thirds of all the
banks had at least one branch outside of their home base, and one fourth maintained at least
ten branches. Only eight banks maintained a nationwide branch network.
The German credit banks relied heavily on foreign funds for their ￿nancing, with 29
percent of their total deposits being foreign. However, foreign debt was distributed very
unevenly across banks, with particularly high shares of foreign deposits at the great branch
banks. At 37 percent of the credit banks, foreign deposits constituted more than ten percent
13The data on foreign debt used in this study can be found in the following ￿les from the Bundesarchiv
Berlin, Reichsbank R2501: 6479, 6482, 6484, 6491-2, 6559, 6634, 6709, 6746, 7712. The construction of the
foreign-debt variable is described in the appendix.
14Our measure seems preferable to the level of medium-term deposits, which has been used as a proxy for
foreign debt (see Balderston, 1994, and Petri, 1998). That variable leads on average to a strong overestimation
of the share of foreign deposits: According to our measure, the average share of foreign deposits was 16
percent on June, 30, 1930; the alternative measure gives an average of 39 percent with the measurement
error ranging from ￿ 7 to + 91 percentage points.
10of total deposits, and at 15 percent of the banks the share was above thirty percent.
19 banks in our sample (17%) failed between 1928 and 1932. In addition, twelve banks
(11%) received public support, three of which still failed. It is interesting to compare the
four diﬀerent bank groups, the failing banks, with or without public support, and the sur-
viving banks, with or without public support. Table 1 summarizes the major ￿ndings. For




Failing banks Surviving banks Surviving
Public support no yes no yes yes
Number of banks 16 3 64 9 4
Total assets, median (million RM) 7 11 8 352 1,815
Total assets, maximum (million RM) 19 38 1,039 3,784 3,784
# branches, median 2 3 2 83 206
# branches, maximum 17 19 154 301 301
Share of foreign deposits, median 9% 9% 9% 38% 41%
Share of foreign deposits, maximum 16% 11% 81% 48% 45%
Cash liquidity, median 1.4% 1.2% 2.5% 2.0% 1.9%
Equity ratio, median 21% 14% 19% 16% 7%
Table 1: Characteristics of diﬀerent bank groups. Notes: The numbers refer to the month before
failure for failing banks, and to November 1931 for surviving banks. The number of banks in this
table is below 110 because it does not include surviving banks for which there is no valid data for
November 1931. Note that the great branch banks are also contained in the column ￿All credit
banks.￿
Table 1 suggests the following preliminary observations: First, outright bank failures
played a minor role in the German crisis. The failing credit banks, supported or not sup-
ported, were very small banks with few branches and low levels of foreign debt. In contrast,
the banks that survived with the help of public support were much more important in terms
of total assets, foreign debt, and the number of branches. Six of the ten largest German
banks, among them all the great branch banks, belonged to this group. In fact, the sum
of total assets of all failing banks was well below the median of total assets of the banks
that received public support and survived. Hence, the real problem in the German crisis
of 1931 were not the banks that actually failed, but the ones that survived only with the
help of the public authorities. Finally, the surviving banks that received support had lower
liquidity and equity ratios than the banks that survived without such support. Particularly
l o we q u i t yr a t i o sw e r ef o u n da tt h eg r e a tb r a n c hb a n k s .
114.2.2 Evolution of deposits
Table 2 conveys a ￿rst impression of the heterogeneity of deposit withdrawals across diﬀerent
bank groups.15 It shows the mean deposit changes for the period between June 1930 and





Monthly reporting credit banks 76 ￿21.6%
10 largest credit banks 10 ￿30.0%
Banks other than 10 largest credit banks 66 ￿20.3%
1 branch 23 ￿21.8%
# branches > 1, not nationally 48 ￿20.8%
Nationwide branch network 5 ￿27.9%
Share of foreign deposits < 10% 50 ￿18.9%
10% ≤ share of foreign deposits < 30% 13 ￿21.9%
Share of foreign deposits ≥ 30% 13 ￿31.5%
Table 2: Percentage change in deposits between June 1930 and November 1931 for diﬀerent bank
groups. Notes: The numbers show the means of the respective bank groups. The table contains all
banks for which deposit data was available at both dates.
Deposits at monthly reporting credit banks decreased by 21.6 percent on average in the
considered time period. The highest withdrawals of deposits were found at the ten largest
credit banks, which lost 30.0 percent of their deposits, while the remaining banks lost only
20.3 percent on average. Hence, the raw data provides no evidence that large banks were
perceived as being particularly safe. Interestingly, the relationship between withdrawals and
branching is not monotonic. The highest withdrawals were found at the banks maintaining
nationwide branch networks, while the lowest withdrawals were found at banks maintaining
regional branch networks. This cannot easily be reconciled with the view that branch banks
were more stable than non-branch banks. As expected, banks with higher shares of foreign
deposits show higher deposit withdrawals. As the following regression analysis will show,
not all results that come out of the descriptive analysis are preserved once we appropriately
control for all relevant factors.
15The variable used in the following analysis is ￿total deposits.￿ It is the sum of the following balance-
sheet items: Foreign acceptance loans (￿Seitens der Kundschaft bei Dritten benutzte Kredite￿), domestic
interbank deposits (￿Deutsche Banken, Bank￿rmen, Sparkassen und sonstige deutsche Kreditinstitute￿),
other deposits, including foreign interbank deposits (￿Sonstige Kreditoren￿), and domestic acceptance loans
(￿Akzepte￿).
124.2.3 Liquidity provision to banks
In the presence of sudden capital reversals, the liquidity of banks becomes a crucial determi-
nant of survival. Hence, in a twin crisis the provision of liquidity by the central bank is one
of the major instruments that can be used to privilege banks. Therefore, an analysis of the
liquidity provision to banks provides a way of testing for implicit guarantees to the largest
banks.
The discounting of bills was the major instrument of the Reichsbank for providing liq-
uidity to the banking sector. Open market operations were still uncommon at that time,
and the amount of lombard loans was small compared to the discounting of bills. The extent
of discounting can be assessed by analyzing the evolution of the endorsement liabilities of
banks. In the analysis, we are going to use the oﬀ-balance-sheet item ￿other endorsement
liabilities,￿ which comprises all the bills of exchange that a bank has passed on, apart from




















































































































Figure 2: Other endorsement liabilities at the largest monthly reporting credit banks and at other
monthly reporting credit banks, February 1929 = 100. Notes: The largest credit banks are the
great Berlin banks and the four largest provincial banks plus all the banks that were merged to
any of these in the period under consideration. The group ￿other credit banks￿ refers to a
constant sample of 59 banks. Gaps in the graphs are due to missing data.
A comparison of the evolution of endorsement liabilities across diﬀerent bank groups
shows that at times of currency turmoil and banking problems ￿ here, namely in the spring
13of 1929, the fall of 1930, and the summer of 1931 ￿ there were sharp increases in endorsement
liabilities at the largest credit banks (see ￿gure 2). At the remaining credit banks, endorse-
ment liabilities increased only mildly in these months, compared to the largest banks. The
question to be answered in the following econometric analysis is whether the particularly
large increase in discount loans at the largest banks was due to their preferential access to
the Reichsbank￿s discount window, as would be predicted by the ￿too-big-to-fail￿ hypothesis.
5 Econometric analysis of deposit ￿ows
5.1 Deposit ￿ows and bank failures
Most existing microeconometric studies on banking crises model the incidence of bank failures
in the context of a hazard model, whereas there are very few papers analyzing deposit ￿ows.
Due to the minor importance of bank failures in the German crisis, an analysis including
deposit ￿ows is clearly preferable to one based on bank failures alone. In addition, deposits
react promptly to macroeconomic shocks and to bank-speci￿c information, whereas failures
typically occur with a lag. However, an analysis of deposit ￿ows may suﬀer from a selection
problem because the banks with the highest deposit withdrawals are most likely to leave the
sample. Therefore, we model deposit ￿ows in a Heckman (1979) selection model, as will be
described in the following subsection. This has a nice side eﬀect: namely, it allows us to
simultaneously model the evolution of deposits and the occurrence of bank failures.16
5.2 Estimation procedure
Our sample is subject to a problem of non-random sample attrition: Banks join and leave
the sample, and the selection into the sample may depend on the changes in deposits. The
problematic cases are bank failures and distress mergers (i. e. a bank close to failure is taken
over by another bank), which are likely to be related to deposit changes. If a bank leaves
the sample for other reasons, this is assumed to be independent of deposit changes. Banks
resulting from mergers are treated like new banks. A list of all failures, distress mergers,
and public standby activities can be found in table A1 in the appendix.
16Schumacher (2000) and Burdisso and Amato (2002) ignore this selection problem.
14To correct for non-random sample attrition, we estimate a Heckman (1979) selection
model. The evolution of deposits is described by the following equation:
￿ d
∗
it = xitβ + εit, (1)
where ￿ d∗
it is the (latent) monthly change in the deposits of bank i at time t,a n dxit is a vector
of bank-speci￿c, region-speci￿c, macroeconomic and other explanatory variables. Selection
i n t ot h es a m p l ei sd e t e r m i n e db yt h ef o l l o w i n ge q u a t i o n :
p
∗
it = zitα + νit, (2)
where p∗
it is a latent variable that determines the observability of ￿ d∗
it:I fp∗
it ≥ 0, the bank
remains in the sample (indicated by a binary variable, which is equal to one in this case)
a n dw eo b s e r v et h et r u ev a l u eo f￿ d∗
it.I fp∗
it < 0, the bank leaves the sample (in which case
the binary variable is equal to zero), and we do not observe latent deposit growth. In both
cases, we observe the control variables x and z. We assume that the two disturbance terms
are jointly normally distributed with a correlation coeﬃcient ρ.
In principle, the parameters in this model are identi￿ed through functional form assump-
tions. However, identi￿cation is generally believed to be more credible if one includes at least
one variable in the selection equation that is not contained in the equation of interest. In
our case, there is a natural means of identi￿cation. Monthly balance sheets were published
with a delay of almost a full month. For instance, the balance sheet referring to March 1928
was published at the end of April 1928. Hence, depositors could react to this balance sheet
no earlier than May 1928. In contrast, the probability of failure clearly would depend on
the most recent balance-sheet ￿gures. Therefore, we exclude the most recent lags of the
balance-sheet variables from the deposit equation.17
5.3 Estimation results
Table 3 presents the results for our main regression equation. We use robust standard
errors throughout. The de￿nitions of all variables can be found in the appendix. The
upper part of the panel displays the deposit equation, the lower part the selection equation.
17In the checks for robustness, we also estimated the model using panel methods (￿xed eﬀects or Arellano￿
Bond estimators). However, these methods estimate the model in ￿rst diﬀerences, implying that all factors
that are time-invariant, such as branching and foreign debt, are not identi￿ed.
15The dependent variable in the main equation is the logarithm of the growth factor of total
deposits at German credit banks.18 In the selection equation, the dependent variable is a
dummy variable, which is equal to one if the bank￿s balance sheet is observed, and zero
in the month when the bank leaves the sample. We also report standardized coeﬃcients.
These give the number of standard deviations that the dependent variable changes when
one increases the independent variable by one standard deviation; for dummy variables, the
standardized coeﬃcient refers to a change in the independent variable from zero to one (in
those cases, the standardized coeﬃcients are given in italics). Note that these coeﬃcients
are ￿exact￿ only in linear regressions. The standardized coeﬃcients allow us to compare the
economic (and not just the statistical) signi￿cance of diﬀerent coeﬃcients.
The results of the deposit equation strongly support the currency-crisis hypothesis. The
variable ￿gold cover,￿ which measures the strength of the currency, enters with a positive sign
and is highly signi￿cant, implying that a strong currency was accompanied by high deposit
growth (or low withdrawals). We also ￿nd that banks with higher shares of foreign deposits
(￿foreign share￿) showed signi￿cantly higher deposit withdrawals than other banks, which
is in line with the idea that foreign depositors reacted more strongly to currency problems
than domestic depositors did. The results also support the banking-crisis hypothesis. Most
importantly, there is a positive and signi￿cant relationship between a bank￿s ￿cash liquidity￿
and its deposit growth. The standardized coeﬃcient is relatively large, implying that the
eﬀect is also economically important.19 Moreover, lagged deposit growth positively aﬀects
current deposit growth. One possible interpretation is that depositors consider banks to be
fragile that suﬀered from high deposit withdrawals in the past.
With respect to solvency, the matter is less clear-cut. The ￿equity ratio￿ has the expected
sign, but it is insigni￿cant; this may be due to the fact that book capital is a poor measure
of a bank￿s solvency. The impact of the stock market crash is measured by the variable
18The use of growth factors is preferable to the use of levels since the levels of variables as deposits are
typically non-stationary. The logarithms are used to remove the skewness from the dependent variable and
to transform the growth factor into a variable that is de￿ned on the entire real line.
19The coeﬃcient of 0.0078 can be interpreted as follows: If the liquidity of one bank is 10 percent higher
than that of another bank, the growth factor is increased by 0.078 percent on a monthly basis. This
corresponds approximately to an annual increase in deposit growth by 1 percentage point, assuming that the
growth factor is close to 1. This is still reinforced through the positive autocorrelation in deposit growth.
16￿stocks,￿ which is the growth of a general stock index, interacted with the bank￿s share of
stocks in total assets; this variable, too, is insigni￿cant.
Dependent 
variable






Deposit growth (-2) 0.0415 0.0322 0.197 0.0493
Deposit growth (-3) 0.0752 0.0270 0.005 0.0830
Cash liquidity (-2) 0.0078 0.0020 0.000 0.0923
Equity ratio (-2) 0.0040 0.0031 0.189 0.0365
Branching 0.0016 0.0033 0.619 0.0236
Foreign share -0.0070 0.0024 0.004 -0.0658
Public 0.0015 0.0039 0.697 0.0220
Total assets (-2) 0.0024 0.0008 0.002 0.0650
Bank stocks (-1) 0.2808 0.0754 0.000 0.0810
Insolvencies (-1) -0.0344 0.0059 0.000 -0.1180
Regional employment (-1) -0.0089 0.0080 0.268 -0.0209
Stocks (-1) -0.9821 0.8032 0.221 -0.0676
Gold cover (-1) 0.0137 0.0041 0.001 0.0683
Constant 0.3065 0.0671 0.000 --
Select
Deposit growth (-1) 1.9609 0.5251 0.000 2.3158
Deposit growth (-2) 2.0851 0.6180 0.001 2.4358
Deposit growth (-3) -0.7226 0.7610 0.342 -0.7787
Cash liquidity (-1) 0.3168 0.1244 0.011 3.6877
Cash liquidity (-2) -0.1294 0.1339 0.334 -1.5047
Equity ratio (-1) 0.6507 0.2555 0.011 5.7817
Equity ratio (-2) -0.2944 0.2371 0.214 -2.6136
Branching 0.0632 0.1660 0.703 0.8961
Foreign share 0.1285 0.1010 0.203 1.1773
Public 0.0441 0.3804 0.908 0.6257
Total assets (-2) 0.2212 0.0796 0.005 5.8494
Bank stocks (-1) 1.4533 4.5268 0.748 0.4096
Insolvencies (-1) -0.5442 0.3573 0.128 -1.8266
Regional employment (-1) 0.0664 0.6473 0.918 0.1526
Stocks (-1) -0.8503 6.6144 0.898 -0.0571
Gold cover (-1) 0.1773 0.3505 0.613 0.8617
Constant 7.5672 4.3975 0.085 --
Rho 0.0415 0.0627 0.509
# Obs (total) 3800
# Failures 19
Wald test Chi†(14): 144.58
p-value 0.0000
Table 3: Results from selection model for growth in total deposits.
Another measure of a bank￿s perceived solvency is its stock price. Since individual stock
prices are not available for all the banks in our sample, we included the growth of an aggre-
gate price index of ￿bank stocks,￿ and it proved to be strongly signi￿cant and economically
17important. However, this variable is uninformative with respect to the eﬀect of individual
bank solvency on deposit withdrawals. The insigni￿cance of the bank-speci￿cs o l v e n c yv a r i -
ables may be due to measurement problems. However, it is also possible that depositors
reacted much more strongly to liquidity than to solvency indicators, because information on
liquidity was more readily available and because liquidity becomes the crucial determinant
of survival in twin crises with sudden capital reversals.
The branch structure does not have a signi￿cant impact on deposit ￿ows; the ￿branching￿
dummy, indicating that a bank has more than one branch, is insigni￿cant. ￿Regional em-
ployment,￿ which is to measure regional shocks, does not enter signi￿cantly in the equation
either. In contrast, the lagged number of national bankruptcies (￿insolvencies￿) is highly
signi￿cant. This indicates that deposit ￿ows were related to national rather than regional
shocks, explaining why a branch network oﬀered little protection. Note that the inclusion
of monthly time dummies leaves all of our main results virtually unchanged. Hence, our
macroeconomic variables appear to capture the macroeconomic evolution very well.
The variable ￿total assets￿ is positive and signi￿cant, implying that large banks expe-
rienced lower deposit withdrawals than small banks, given the riskiness of their portfolios.
This is consistent with a ￿too-big-to-fail￿ interpretation: Large banks￿ creditors may have
trusted more in the safety of their deposits, because they anticipated that their banks had
a higher probability of being supported in a crisis. The result is all the more striking if we
compare it to the descriptive results in section 4.2: There we have seen that large banks
experienced particularly high deposit withdrawals. If we accept the ￿too-big-to-fail￿ inter-
pretation, this means that large banks would have suﬀered even higher withdrawals in the
absence of an implicit guarantee.
We now turn to the interpretation of the selection equation. ρ, which denotes the correla-
tion coeﬃcient of the disturbances in the two equations, and hence the conditional correlation
between changes in deposits and bank survival, shows the expected sign, but it is insigni￿-
cant. This indicates that selection is not an important issue in this dataset; this may be due
to the low number of failures in our sample. It is still worthwhile to have a look at the deter-
minants of bank survival. Lagged ￿deposit growth￿ has a positive and signi￿cant eﬀect on
bank survival. Hence, high withdrawals in the past increase the probability of failure. Bank
survival also depends positively on a bank￿s strength, as measured by liquidity and equity
ratios. Bank survival is unrelated to the presence of a branch network or to the share of
18foreign debt. In contrast, bank size has a highly signi￿cant positive eﬀect on bank survival;
large banks had a higher probability of survival than small banks. Again, this is consistent
with large banks being ￿too big to fail.￿20 None of the macroeconomic variables enters the
selection equation signi￿c a n t l y ;t h i ss u g g e s t st h a tt h ei n c i d e n c eo ff a i l u r e sw a sr e l a t e dm u c h
more to bank-speci￿c characteristics than to macroeconomic variables.
We can conclude that the results from table 3 support the currency- and the banking-
crisis hypotheses, which is consistent with the view that the currency and the banking
crisis were superimposed upon, and possibly reinforced, each other. The strong relationship
between banks￿ liquidity ratios and deposit withdrawals stresses the role of liquidity in twin
crises. We can reject the branching hypothesis, since the maintenance of a branch network
aﬀects neither deposit growth nor bank survival. Finally, the signi￿cant impact of size on
the deposit growth and bank survival is consistent with the ￿too-big-to-fail￿ hypothesis.
5.4 Robustness checks
We performed a large number of robustness checks concerning the choice of dependent vari-
able, sample period, bank groups in the sample, the treatment of outliers, and ￿nally the
estimation method. Table A3 in the appendix summarizes the major results from these
regressions. Here we only want to stress some interesting ￿ndings that came out of these
additional regressions. As you can see from table A3, most of the eﬀe c t ss h o w ni nt h eb a s i c
regression in table 3 are robust to the modi￿cations. The only result that proves not to be
entirely robust is the relationship between bank size and deposit growth. In contrast, size
has a very robust eﬀect on the survival probability.
O n em a ya r g u et h a to u re v i d e n c ei sn o ts u ﬃcient to support the banking-crisis hypoth-
esis because one should always observe higher withdrawals at weaker banks if depositors
distinguish at all between stronger and weaker banks. To counter this objection, we reran
the regression allowing for a structural break between crisis and non-crisis periods. If bank-
ing problems were an independent cause of the German twin crisis, we would expect the
relationship between banks￿ liquidity and solvency and deposit withdrawals to be ampli￿ed
in crisis periods. Indeed, we ￿nd that the eﬀects of liquidity and banks￿ stock prices are
20In a strict sense, the ￿too-big-to-fail￿ problem refers to the ex-ante probability of failure. Therefore, a
test based on ex-post probabilities is, of course, imperfect.
19reinforced in crisis periods, de￿ned as months with a decrease in aggregate deposits (see
table A4). This suggests that depositors reacted more strongly to information about their
bank￿s strength in times of crisis, which underlines the importance of banking problems in
explaining deposit withdrawals, especially during crisis periods. The coeﬃcient of the share
of foreign deposits also increases in size, suggesting that foreign withdrawals were also more
important in crisis periods.
Moreover, one may wonder whether our results are biased due to the banks￿ unobserved
heterogeneity. Note ￿r s tt h a ta n yu n o b s e r v e de ﬀect in the levels of deposits would have been
diﬀerenced out by the use of growth factors. To control for unobserved eﬀects in the growth
factors, we reran our regressions using panel methods (see table A5). The left panel of the
table displays the results from a ￿xed eﬀects regression. With weak dependence of the time
series process of deposits, the inconsistency resulting from using ￿xed eﬀects in the presence
of lagged dependent variables is of the order T−1 (Wooldridge 2002, p. 302), which is small
given the length of our panel. However, we also present the results from an Arellano-Bond
(1991) estimation (right panel). In both cases, we neglect the selection problem. We added
an interaction term of the gold cover and the foreign share, because the variable ￿foreign
share￿ drops out in both regressions due to the diﬀerencing of the data; this does hardly
aﬀect the remaining coeﬃcients. The main ￿nding is that the eﬀect of liquidity is very
robust and much stronger than in the pooled regression. The coeﬃcients of the gold cover
and the new interaction term also support the results from the pooled regression; again the
results are generally stronger. However, the eﬀect of total assets is negative and strongly
signi￿cant. This result is driven by the fact that the panel methods use only the within-
variation, i.e. the variation of total assets of one bank over time. In our test, however, we are
interested in the cross-sectional variation of total assets21; in fact, the ￿xed eﬀects prove to
be strongly positively correlated (cross-sectionally) with the initial total assets, controlling
for other variables.22 This supports our result from the pooled regression. For completeness,
we also present the results of regressions where total assets are not included (see table A5).
21Even a drop in total assets by 30 percent at Deutsche Bank would not change the relative size of the
bank much, compared to the remaining banking sector. Especially, it would not aﬀect the perception that
Deutsche Bank is too big to fail.
22Note also that the results from the pooled regression are virtually unchanged when one uses initial total
assets instead of current total assets.
20Regarding the impact of a bank￿s size on deposit withdrawals and failure probabilities,
one may wonder whether this result is driven merely by the four largest banks, namely the
great branch banks. Therefore, we allowed for a structural break between the great branch
banks and the remaining banks. Interestingly, none of the eﬀects hinges on the presence of
the great branch banks in the sample. In particular, ￿total assets￿ remain signi￿cant for
the other banks in the deposit equation. This indicates that the implicit guarantee was not
believed to be limited to the great branch banks.
In addition, one may expect the relationship between bank-speci￿c characteristics and
deposit withdrawals to change after public standby activities. In order to check this, we
allowed coeﬃcients for supported banks to change after the standby activity. The most
i m p o r t a n tr e s u l ti st h a tt h ee ﬀect of liquidity is signi￿cantly smaller for the supported banks.
This suggests that the link between bank-speci￿c characteristics and changes in deposits was
weakened for supported banks, which is in line with a moral-hazard argument. In fact, the
structural break is signi￿cant at a 5 percent con￿dence level.
W ec a nc o n c l u d et h a tm o s to ft h ee ﬀects shown in the basic regression in table 3 are
robust to the modi￿cations. Hence, the robustness checks con￿rm the acceptance of both
the currency- and the banking-crisis hypothesis. We can reject the branching hypothesis,
as the maintenance of a branch network aﬀects neither deposit growth nor bank survival.
Finally, the relationship between asset size and deposit growth is not entirely robust. Hence,
we cannot assert with con￿dence that larger banks exhibited lower deposit withdrawals. In
contrast, size has a very robust eﬀect on the survival probability. Thus, we can safely claim
that larger banks were less likely to fail.
6 Econometric analysis of standby activities
6.1 Estimation procedure and results
The preceding analysis of deposit ￿ows has con￿rmed one necessary condition for the con-
tention that large banks were considered to be ￿too big to fail,￿ namely that larger banks
had a lower probability of failure than smaller banks. The results suggest that this may
also have translated into lower deposit withdrawals, even though this eﬀect is not entirely
robust. While both results are consistent with the ￿too-big-to-fail￿ explanation, they could
21also indicate that large banks were better able to withstand the crisis for other reasons such
as better diversi￿cation.23 Therefore, we also directly analyze public standby activities to
￿nd out whether large banks received privileged treatment in times of crisis. The descrip-
tive analysis in section 4.2 has already shown that many large banks bene￿ted from public
support activities, and that the increase in endorsement liabilities in times of crisis was par-
ticularly strong at the larger banks. We will now examine these preliminary ￿ndings more
thoroughly in an econometric analysis.
First, we check whether the probability of receiving public support was higher for larger
banks than for smaller ones. Table 4 presents the results of a simple cross-sectional probit
regression, where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a bank
received public support, such as capital injections, public guarantees, or public loans other
than ordinary re￿nancing loans provided by the Reichsbank. The independent variables refer











First-order liquidity -0.0743 0.0396 0.008 -0.3033
Equity ratio 0.0278 0.0402 0.474 0.1006
Branching 0.1242 0.0472 0.094 0.8540
Foreign share 0.0377 0.0277 0.188 0.1377
Total assets 0.0446 0.0201 0.003 0.4795
# Obs 91
Pseudo R† 0.3264
Table 4: Results from probit regression for standby activities.
As predicted by the ￿too-big-to-fail￿ hypothesis, bank size has a signi￿cantly positive
eﬀect on the probability of receiving public support, which con￿rms the preliminary ￿nding
23However, recent evidence for the United States has shown that even though large banks tend to be better
diversi￿ed, this does not translate into a reduction in the banks￿ risk (Demsetz and Strahan 1997).
24The coeﬃcients in the table correspond to the change in the probability of being supported for an
in￿nitesimal change in each independent continuous variable, and to the discrete change in the probability
for dummy variables. All eﬀects are evaluated at the means of the independent variables. The standardized
coeﬃcients refer to the original coeﬃcients.
22from the descriptive analysis in section 4.2. An increase in total assets by one percent leads
to an increase in the support probability by 0.04 percent, which is substantial if you keep in
m i n dt h a tt h el a r g e s tb a n ki no u rs a m p l ei sm o r et h a n5 , 0 0 0t i m e sa sb i ga st h es m a l l e s to n e .
Note that this equation controls for other bank-speci￿c variables. So the larger probability of
support at the larger banks was not simply due to the fact that they needed the support most
(for example, due to their low liquidity ratios). The branching variable is weakly signi￿cant.
In fact, branch networks can be interpreted here as measuring another aspect of size, namely
geographical dispersion. Moreover, we ￿nd that banks with lower ￿rst-order liquidity ratios
were more likely to be supported. In contrast, there is neither a relationship to the equity
ratio, nor to the share of foreign deposits.
Second, we examine the provision of liquidity by the Reichsbank. Under the gold stan-
dard, monetary policy had to proceed subject to the constraint that the gold cover did not
fall below the prescribed forty-percent level. In normal times, this constraint was not bind-
ing, but in times of crisis, the Reichsbank imposed discount restrictions, trying to limit the
aggregate quantity of discount loans to a level compatible with the maintenance of the gold
standard.25 Hence, there were two diﬀerent policy regimes for liquidity provision, a crisis
regime with credit rationing and a non-crisis regime with free liquidity provision. This will
be taken into account in the econometric analysis by allowing for a structural break between
crisis and non-crisis periods.
The question then is how the Reichsbank distributed the given aggregate level of discount
loans among diﬀerent banks in the rationing regime. The ￿too-big-to-fail￿ hypothesis asserts
that large banks were given privileged access to the Reichsbank￿s rediscounting facilities in
times of crisis, meaning that larger banks were rationed less than smaller banks due to their
economic signi￿cance. This is a statement about the supply of discount loans by the Reichs-
bank to diﬀerent banks. In general, one does not observe the supply directly. In a rationing
regime, however, the level of discount loans equals the minimum of supply and demand, and
changes in the levels of discount loans are determined by the supply side alone as long as the
rationing constraint is binding. This can be exploited here to identify the supply-side eﬀect.
Table 5 presents the results from a selection model for the growth in endorsement lia-
bilities.26 The correlation coeﬃcient ρ is again insigni￿cant. The results for the selection
25For evidence on these discount restrictions, see Schnabel (2004a).
26The regression of endorsement liabilities suﬀers from the same selection problem as the regression of
23equation are suppressed here because they are similar to the ones in the other table. In
the main equation, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the growth factor of ￿other
endorsement liabilities.￿ The panel on the left of table 5 displays the coeﬃcients for non-
crisis periods, while the panel on the right shows the estimates for crisis periods. A crisis
regime is de￿ned as a period with aggregate deposit withdrawals. An alternative de￿nition
based on the gold cover yields almost the same classi￿cation, as the two variables are highly
correlated. Under the ￿too-big-to-fail￿ hypothesis, we expect a bank￿s size to have a positive
eﬀect on endorsement growth in crisis periods, but not in non-crisis periods.
Dependent 
variable
Independent variables Coefficient p-value Standardized 
coefficient




Total assets (-1) 0.0008 0.848 0.0042 0.0142 0.018 0.0776
Endorsement growth (-1) -0.0782 0.065 -0.0731 -0.1153 0.003 -0.1262
Endorsement growth (-2) -0.0405 0.232 -0.0360 -0.0442 0.152 -0.0515
Endorsement growth (-3) -0.0294 0.317 -0.0289 -0.0626 0.097 -0.0703
Deposit growth (-1) 0.3242 0.001 0.0735 0.3079 0.002 0.0735
Deposit growth (-2) -0.0247 0.694 -0.0062 0.1426 0.267 0.0319
Deposit growth (-3) -0.0694 0.406 -0.0148 0.1413 0.147 0.0328
Share of bills (-1) 0.0154 0.023 0.0437 0.0217 0.006 0.0677
Cash liquidity (-1) -0.0105 0.226 -0.0249 -0.0258 0.045 -0.0616
Equity ratio (-1) -0.0079 0.536 -0.0144 0.0143 0.452 0.0261
Foreign share -0.0150 0.233 -0.0279 -0.0130 0.411 -0.0253
Branching 0.0117 0.462 0.0342 0.0120 0.577 0.0349
Public 0.0133 0.689 0.0387 -0.0496 0.106 -0.1444
Gold cover (-1) -0.0116 0.719 -0.0085 0.0546 0.008 0.0617
Constant -0.1007 0.062 -- -0.0626 0.366 --
Select ...
Rho -0.010 0.980
# Obs (total) 3,689
# Failures 19
Wald test Chi†(30): 121.42
p-value 0.0000
No crisis Crisis
Table 5: Results from selection model for growth in endorsement liabilities, allowing for a
structural break between crisis and non-crisis periods.
deposit changes. The presence of a bank in the sample depends on how much liquidity it receives from the
Reichsbank and is, therefore, not random. Hence, we apply the same estimation procedure as in table 3 in
order to control for non-random sample attrition. Here, we use a number of lagged macroeconomic variables
(such as insolvencies, employment, stock prices) as instruments.
24The regression results strongly support the conjecture that large banks received preferen-
tial access to the Reichsbank￿s rediscounting facilities in times of crisis. Endorsement growth
in crisis periods is signi￿cantly related to the size of banks, given the control variables, and
the standardized coeﬃcient is large compared to the other coeﬃcients. In contrast, size does
not matter in non-crisis periods. This is exactly what would have been expected under the
￿too-big-to-fail￿ hypothesis.27
It is also instructive to examine the other coeﬃcients in the regression even though one
has to be careful with a structural interpretation.28 In both crisis and non-crisis periods,
the growth in endorsement liabilities displays a negative autocorrelation, meaning that high
growth rates were likely to be followed by small ones and vice versa. In times of crisis, a
lower cash liquidity implied a higher growth in endorsement liabilities, re￿ecting the greater
need for liquidity. However, the discounting of bills was only possible if the bank actually
possessed bill material eligible for discount. This explains the highly signi￿cant coeﬃcient
of the share of bills in total assets. The same eﬀect is also present in non-crisis periods.
If liquidity pressure was a driving force of endorsement growth in times of crisis, one
would also expect past deposit growth and the share of foreign deposits to have signi￿cant
eﬀects on endorsement growth. However, the coeﬃcient of deposit growth has the ￿wrong￿
sign, whereas the ￿foreign share￿ is insigni￿cant. This suggests that the process of liquidity
provision was not guided by considerations of needs alone. Finally, the growth rate of
endorsement liabilities depends positively on the Reichsbank￿s gold cover in times of crisis.
This re￿ects the constraints imposed upon the Reichsbank by the gold standard. The higher
the gold cover, the wider the Reichsbank￿s scope for rediscounting activities.
We can conclude that there is strong evidence that large banks received privileged treat-
ment, both with respect to public supporting activities, such as capital injections and public
guarantees, and with respect to rediscounting. In combination with our ￿ndings on deposit
27An interesting question is whether the privileged treatment was anticipated by the large banks. In our
sample, the correlation between the cash liquidity ratio and total assets is negative and highly signi￿cant.
This is consistent with the view that large banks reduced their liquidity holdings in the anticipation of a
privileged treatment at the discount window.
28Note that the regression in table 5 is not a demand or supply curve. The eﬀect of the price variable is
not modeled here. Instead, the regression gives the allocation of discount loans across diﬀerent banks.
25￿ows and bank failures, this provides strong evidence for the ￿too-big-to-fail￿ hypothesis.
6.2 Robustness checks
We conducted a large number of robustness checks for the regression of endorsement lia-
bilities. The simple probit regression does not lend itself to a further robustness analysis.
As before, we examined the robustness of our results regarding the choice of the dependent
variable, sample period, bank groups included in the sample, the treatment of outliers, and
￿nally the estimation method. As you can see from summary table A6, the results from table
5, especially that concerning ￿total assets,￿ prove to be extremely robust, strengthening our
￿nding that large banks were privileged, being provided with greater liquidity.
One may wonder whether it is appropriate to pool the data before and after July 1931,
because the process of liquidity provision may have changed after the gold standard was
abandoned, since this removed an important constraint to monetary policy. Therefore, we
reran the regression allowing for another structural break after July 1931 (see table A7). In
fact, the results show some notable diﬀerences from the pooled regression. First, the size of
ab a n ki ss i g n i ￿cant only in crisis periods before the bank holiday, while it turns insigni￿cant
after July 1931. This suggests that large banks were privileged primarily in times when the
gold standard constraint was still binding. Second, the share of bills and the gold cover
are signi￿cant for crisis and non-crisis periods before July 1931, but in both cases they turn
insigni￿cant after July 1931. This indicates that the provision of liquidity in the latter period
was no longer limited by gold standard considerations, nor by the availability of bills. A
Chow test shows that the structural break is, in fact, signi￿cant at the 5 percent level.
Moreover, we checked again whether the results hinged on the presence of the great
branch banks in the sample. Indeed, the coeﬃcient of ￿total assets￿ becomes insigni￿cant
when we exclude the great branch banks. Hence, the privileged treatment of the great branch
banks seems to drive the result regarding the eﬀect of bank size on discounting.
We can conclude that the results from the regression of endorsement liabilities, espe-
cially that concerning ￿total assets,￿ are extremely robust to various modi￿cations. This
strongly supports the view that large banks, and especially the great branch banks, enjoyed
preferential access to the Reichsbank￿s rediscounting facilities.
267C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has studied the interaction between micro- and macroeconomic factors in twin
crises by analyzing one particular episode on the basis of individual bank data, namely the
German twin crisis of 1931. Our analysis has shown that this crisis should be described as
both a currency and a banking crisis. Deposit withdrawals were particularly high at times of
currency disturbances, and banks holding foreign debt lost more deposits than other banks.
In addition, illiquid banks lost more deposits than liquid banks, especially in times of crisis,
indicating that depositors withdrew their funds primarily from banks that were thought to
be particularly fragile. In this respect, twin crises appear to be no diﬀerent from banking
crises that are not accompanied by currency crises. Moreover, the incidence of failures was
r e l a t e dm u c hm o r et ob a n k - s p e c i ￿c characteristics than to macroeconomic variables. Thus,
both deposit growth and the incidence of failures suggest that the (macroeconomic) currency
crisis was accompanied by a (microeconomic) banking crisis.
Our results suggest that the particular severity of the German twin crisis, and of twin
crises in general, may be due to the mutual reinforcement of banking and currency problems.
A run on the currency tends to weaken banks, and the run on banks may weaken the
currency. This is consistent with Kaminsky and Reinhart￿s (1999) conjecture that there is a
vicious spiral between the two phenomena. An evaluation of the relative importance of the
banking and the currency problems is beyond the scope of this paper, and it may not even
be very useful, given the mutual interdependence between the two phenomena. However,
we hope to shift the view away from unidirectional explanations of twin crises to a more
diﬀerentiated view, where banking and currency problems may be superimposed upon, and
possibly reinforce, each other.
Furthermore, our results question the bene￿ts of branch networks in twin crises. Branch
banks exhibited neither lower deposit withdrawals in times of crisis, nor a lower probability
of failure. This does not necessarily mean that branch networks in general do not oﬀer
any protection. Our preferred interpretation is that national shocks were more prevalent
in the German crisis than regional shocks. In such crises, the diversi￿cation eﬀects oﬀered
by branch networks may be negligible, as many risks are not diversi￿able. In fact, in our
regressions, regional indicators had no signi￿cant eﬀect on deposit growth or on the incidence
of bank failures. In this respect, the German crisis seems to have been very diﬀerent from
the various banking crises in the United States during the Great Depression, where regional
27shocks played an important role (see, e.g., Wicker 1996).
Carlson and Mitchener (2003) have argued that branching may enhance aggregate sta-
bility by intensifying competition and forcing weak banks to exit the system. This would
actually be consistent with lower stability at the individual bank level. In contrast, our ￿nd-
ings suggest that a banking system with large branch banks is likely to be more vulnerable
to ￿nancial crises. The reason is that branch banks tend to be large banks, which may suﬀer
from a moral-hazard problem because depositors and the public authorities consider these
banks to be ￿too big to fail.￿ In fact, our results lend considerable support to the ￿too-big-to-
fail￿ hypothesis. In the German crisis, large banks were less likely to fail, and more likely to
be bailed out than smaller banks. In addition, large banks received preferential access to the
Reichsbank￿s discount window. This strongly supports the view that the public authorities
considered the large banks to be ￿too big to fail.￿ There is also some, albeit weaker, evi-
dence that depositors anticipated the bail-outs and were therefore less inclined to withdraw
their deposits from larger banks. Also, cash liquidity ratios are negatively correlated with
the banks￿ size, which may suggest that the large banks themselves anticipated a privileged
treatment at the discount window. By attracting high levels of ￿hot￿ foreign debt, while
holding low liquidity levels, the large banks may, in fact, have increased the vulnerability of
the German economy to a twin crisis.
It is worthwhile to compare these ￿ndings with the work by Kryzanowski and Roberts
(1993), who have documented a similar ￿too-big-to-fail￿ problem at Canadian banks during
the Great Depression. Interestingly, the diagnoses of the underlying problems are very simi-
lar, while the problems manifested themselves in very diﬀerent ways: Germany experienced
a severe banking crisis, while Canada (which also suﬀered from a currency crisis) became
the prime example of the stability of large branch banks. Our analysis suggests that one
possible reason for this diﬀerence is that German banks were much more reliant on foreign
debt, which aggravated the intertwinement of the banking and the currency problems.
Finally, our paper has shown that the moral hazard problem does not depend on the
existence of oﬃcial deposit insurance or other explicit guarantees. Implicit guarantees can
be just as destabilizing. In the context of a twin crisis, such guarantees become particularly
problematic if they aﬀect the provision of liquidity because the excessive provision of liquidity
to some privileged banks may itself precipitate the collapse of the currency.
28Appendix
Data construction
Foreign debt variables The variable ￿foreign share￿ used in our regression analysis is
de￿ned as the share of foreign deposits in total deposits. The variable was only calculated for
June 30, 1930, as there are no continuous time series for a suﬃciently large number of banks.
The levels of foreign acceptance loans can be obtained from the banks￿ monthly balance
sheets, but the levels of foreign cash loans can only be inferred from archival material. For
June 1930, the Reichsbank￿s archival material contains detailed information on the levels of
foreign debt for those banks holding large amounts of foreign debt. In addition, it contains
the aggregate level of foreign deposits for all monthly reporting banks. In order to estimate
the levels of foreign cash loans at individual banks, the non-attributable part of the aggregate
level of cash loans was distributed evenly among the remaining credit banks, assuming that
the Staatsbanken, Landesbanken, and Girozentralen (SLGs) did not hold any foreign cash
loans, unless it was speci￿ed explicitly in the Reichsbank￿s material.29 For banks that did
not publish balance sheets in June 1930, the levels of acceptance loans were updated on the
basis of the aggregate evolution of acceptance loans.
29This assumption is consistent with the statement in EnquŒte-Ausschu￿ (1930, p. 80) that the bulk of
banks￿ foreign debt was held by the German credit banks and private bankers, not the SLGs.
29Bank failures and oﬃcial standby activities Table A1 lists those banks that we have
classi￿ed as failures, distress mergers, and as banks receiving oﬃcial support. It also lists
the respective dates.
Date Bank name Classi￿ed as ...
Sep 28 Berliner Bankverein Failure
Sep 29 Kieler Bank Failure
Nov 29 Bankverein Bischofswerda Failure
Dec 29 Ostbank f￿r Handel und Gewerbe Distress merger
Feb 30 Frankfurter Bankverein Failure
Dec 30 Rheinisch-Westf￿lische Getreide-Kredit AG Failure
May 31 Hansabank Oberschlesien Failure
May 31 Bankhaus B￿hl und Co. Failure
May 31 Rheinische Bauernbank Standby
Jun 31 Gewerbebank Distress merger
Jul 31 Dresdner Bank Standby
Jul 31 Darmst￿dter und Nationalbank (Danatbank) Standby
Jul 31 Allgemeine Deutsche Credit-Anstalt Standby
Aug 31 Hallescher Bankenverein von Kulisch, Kaempf & Co. Standby
Aug 31 Leipziger Credit-Bank Standby
Sep 31 Bank f￿r Handel und Gewerbe Failure
Sep 31 Leipziger Credit-Bank Failure
Sep 31 Leipziger Immobilien-Gesellschaft Bank f￿r Grundbesitz AG Failure
Oct 31 Rheinische Bauernbank Failure
Oct 31 Hollandsche Credietbank Failure
Nov 31 Vorschu￿- und Spar-Vereins-Bank in L￿beck Failure
Dec 31 Anhalt-Dessauische Landesbank Standby
Dec 31 Commerz-Bank in L￿beck Standby
Feb 32 Werniger￿der Bank f￿r Handel und Gewerbe Failure
Feb 32 Dresdner Bank (merged with Danatbank) Standby
Feb 32 Commerz- und Privat-Bank (merged with Barmer Bank-Verein) Standby
Feb 32 Allgemeine Deutsche Credit-Anstalt Standby
Feb 32 Deutsche Bank und Disconto-Gesellschaft Standby
Jun 32 St￿dte- und Staatsbank der Oberlausitz Failure
Jun 32 Anhalt-Dessauische Landesbank Distress merger
Jul 32 Bernburger Bank Failure
Aug 32 Westfalenbank Standby
Table A1: Bank failures, distress mergers, and oﬃcial standby activities. Source: Die Bank.
30Descriptive statistics The following table contains the descriptive statistics of the vari-
ables used in the regressions. If the variables enter the regressions in logarithmic forms,
the given statistics refer to the variables before the logarithmic transformation. The sources
are denoted as follows: 1 = Deutscher Reichs- und Preu￿ischer Staatsanzeiger, 2 = Sal-
ing￿s B￿rsenpapiere (1930), 3 = Bundesarchiv Berlin (Reichsbank R2501, diverse ￿les), 4 =
Die Bank (diverse issues), 5 = Institut f￿r Konjunkturforschung (1936), 6 = James (1985,
pp. 358).
Variable name Description Functional 
form
# Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sources
Deposit growth Total deposits (including acceptances) log of 
growth 
factor
3781 0.997 0.071 0.428 2.190 1
Cash liquidity (Cash + deposits at central bank) / 
total deposits (including acceptances)
log 3800 0.026 0.020 0.000 0.283 1
First-order 
liquidity
(Cash + deposits at central bank + 
deposits at other banks + bills of 
exchange) / total deposits (including 
acceptances)
log 3800 0.340 0.478 0.006 10.905 1
Equity ratio (Capital + reserves) / total assets log 3800 0.214 0.143 0.048 0.878 1
Branching Dummy = 1 if number of branches > 
1, 0 otherwise
3800 0.680 0.466 0 1 2
Foreign share Foreign deposits / total deposits on 
June 30, 1930
log 3800 0.155 0.137 0.007 0.814 3
Public Dummy = 1 if bank is public, 0 
otherwise
3800 0.061 0.240 0 1 2, 4
Total assets Total assets in million Reichsmark log 3800 165.4 568.4 0.9 5726.8 1
Bank stocks Stock index for bank shares log of 
growth 
factor
3800 0.987 0.020 0.942 1.033 5
Insolvencies Number of corporate insolvencies log 3800 1247 291 727 1972 5
Regional 
employment
Regional number of employees, 
January 1928 = 100
log 3800 93.7 14.8 62.0 140.8 5
Stocks General stock index [Descriptive 






with share of 
stocks
3800 0.988 0.040 0.898 1.130 5
Share of stocks Share of security portfolio in total 
assets
3800 0.063 0.098 0.000 0.874 1
Gold cover Reichsbank reserves / Reichsbank 
note circulation
log 3800 0.478 0.138 0.225 0.657 5, 6
Endorsement 
growth
Endorsement liabilities log of 
growth 
factor
3670 1.028 0.408 0.140 7.000 1
Share of bills Bills of exchange / Total assets log   3689 0.138 0.100 0.000 0.863 1
Table A2: De￿nition of variables, descriptive statistics, and sources.
31Robustness checks
Deposit ￿ows
Type of robustness 
check Modification Main result
Dependent variable Exclude domestic acceptances All effects are robust.
Dependent variable Exclude all acceptances and 
interbank deposits
All effects are robust.
Independent variables Inclusion of time dummies All effects are robust.
Sample period Use crisis periods only (= 
periods with aggregate deposit 
withdrawals)
Deposit equation: Coefficients of "cash liquidity" and "bank stocks" 
increase, "total assets," "gold cover" no longer significant. 
Selection equation: All effects are robust. (See table A4).
Sample period Consider only time until July 
1931
All effects are robust.
Bank groups included Exclude banks not active in 
retail business (deposits < 30% 
of total assets)
All effects are robust.
Bank groups included Allow for structural break 
between great branch banks 
and remaining banks
All effects are robust for remaining banks, only significant 
deviation: coefficient of "bank stocks" larger for great branch 
banks, structural break is weakly significant (p-value = 0.084). 
Bank groups included Allow for structural break 
between supported and not 
supported banks
Coefficient of "cash liquidity" significantly smaller for supported 
banks, structural break is significant at 5%-level.
Sensitivity to outliers Do not exclude any outliers "Total assets" no longer significant in deposit equations, all other 
effects are robust. 
Sensitivity to outliers Exclude more outliers All effects are robust.
Estimation method OLS with robust standard 
errors
All effects are robust.
Estimation method Use of panel methods (fixed 
effects, Arellano-Bond)
Most effects are robust. "Total assets" show "wrong" sign. But: 
Cross-sectional correlation between initial "total assets" and fixed 
effects as expected. (See table A5)
Table A3: Summary table ￿ Robustness checks for deposit changes.
32Dependent 
variable







Deposit growth (-2) 0.0077 0.0435 0.860 0.0082
Deposit growth (-3) 0.0970 0.0452 0.032 0.1068
Cash liquidity (-2) 0.0106 0.0034 0.002 0.1204
Equity ratio (-2) 0.0029 0.0045 0.518 0.0257
Branching 0.0058 0.0048 0.234 0.0004
Foreign share -0.0088 0.0040 0.026 -0.0824
Public 0.0077 0.0059 0.192 0.1082
Total assets (-2) 0.0007 0.0013 0.598 0.0175
Bank stocks (-1) 0.4367 0.1632 0.007 0.1127
Insolvencies (-1) -0.0448 0.0121 0.000 -0.1207
Regional employment (-1) 0.0032 0.0119 0.791 0.0068
Stocks (-1) -1.6741 1.5957 0.294 -0.1122
Gold cover (-1) 0.0007 0.0062 0.913 0.0037
Constant 0.3208 0.1030 0.002 --
Select
Deposit growth (-1) 2.0356 0.6874 0.003 1.8858
Deposit growth (-2) 1.9196 0.8355 0.022 1.6872
Deposit growth (-3) -1.1305 0.7115 0.112 -1.0160
Cash liquidity (-1) 0.3070 0.1134 0.007 2.8932
Cash liquidity (-2) -0.0941 0.1220 0.441 -0.8738
Equity ratio (-1) 0.8323 0.3938 0.035 5.9861
Equity ratio (-2) -0.4220 0.3771 0.263 -3.0311
Branching 0.1455 0.1903 0.445 1.6619
Foreign share 0.1415 0.1255 0.259 1.0754
Public -0.1020 0.4208 0.808 -1.1655
Total assets (-2) 0.2384 0.0965 0.014 5.1211
Bank stocks (-1) -1.1860 8.4640 0.889 -0.2503
Insolvencies (-1) -0.8229 0.5614 0.143 -1.8162
Regional employment (-1) 0.5304 0.9766 0.587 0.9299
Stocks (-1) -6.0124 17.9052 0.737 -0.3283
Gold cover (-1) 0.0173 0.5324 0.974 0.0766
Constant 7.4184 5.0811 0.144 --
Rho 0.0470 0.0865 0.587





Table A4: Robustness check for deposit changes ￿ Restriction of sample to crisis periods.
33Dependent 
variable
Independent variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Deposit 
growth
Deposit growth (-1) 0.0106 0.528 -0.0409 0.024
Deposit growth (-2) 0.0363 0.009 0.0256 0.064 0.0398 0.019 -0.0301 0.095
Deposit growth (-3) 0.0708 0.000 0.0613 0.000 -0.0182 0.262 -0.0677 0.000
Cash liquidity (-2) 0.0147 0.000 0.0189 0.000 0.0134 0.001 0.0194 0.000
Equity ratio (-2) -0.0120 0.208 0.0120 0.173 -0.2170 0.000 0.0387 0.363
Branching (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Foreign share (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Public (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Total assets (-2) -0.0567 0.000 -0.5205 0.000
Bank stocks (-1) 0.2394 0.000 0.2665 0.000 -0.0607 0.316 0.0887 0.179
Insolvencies (-1) -0.0251 0.000 -0.0329 0.000 -0.0052 0.450 -0.0390 0.000
Regional employment (-1) 0.0028 0.826 -0.0049 0.705 0.1310 0.000 0.0049 0.880
Stocks (-1) -0.8215 0.001 -0.9036 0.001 0.3194 0.275 0.1614 0.618
Gold cover (-1) 0.0150 0.014 0.0091 0.134 0.0619 0.000 -0.0100 0.551
Gold cover (-1) * Foreign 
share
0.0695 0.002 0.0522 0.022 0.1097 0.028 0.0548 0.555
Constant 0.3775 0.000 0.3603 0.000 0.0003 0.000 -0.0007 0.014
# Obs (total) 3,781 3,781 3,666 3,666
Fixed effects regression Arellano-Bond regression
Incl. total assets Without total assets Incl. total assets Without total assets
Table A5: Robustness check for deposit changes ￿ Fixed eﬀects regression and Arellano-Bond
estimation.
Endorsement liabilities
Type of robustness 
check Modification Main result
Dependent variable Include bank acceptances and 
promissory notes
All effects are robust.
Sample period Allow for another structural break 
after July 1931
"Total assets", "share of bills", and "gold cover" are 
insignificant after July 1931. Structural break is significant at 
the 5 percent level. (See table A6).
Bank groups included Exclude banks not active in retail 
business (deposits < 30% of total 
assets)
All effects are robust.
Bank groups included Allow for structural break between 
great branch banks and remaining 
banks
Coefficient of "total assets" is insignificant for banks other 
than the great branch banks.
Sensitivity to outliers Do not exclude any outliers or 
exclude more outliers
All effects are robust.
Estimation method OLS with robust standard errors All effects are robust.
Table A6: Summary table ￿ Robustness checks for endorsement liabilities.
34Dependent 
variable
Independent variables Coefficient p-value Standardized 
coefficient




Total assets (-1) 0.0004 0.930 0.003 0.0201 0.013 0.121
Endorsement growth (-1) -0.0666 0.136 -0.076 -0.1339 0.010 -0.130
Endorsement growth (-2) -0.0379 0.312 -0.042 -0.1183 0.035 -0.112
Endorsement growth (-3) -0.0483 0.153 -0.059 -0.0775 0.187 -0.075
Deposit growth (-1) 0.3961 0.002 0.109 0.3001 0.044 0.076
Deposit growth (-2) 0.0102 0.906 0.003 -0.1692 0.349 -0.033
Deposit growth (-3) -0.0570 0.582 -0.015 0.0316 0.724 0.007
Share of bills (-1) 0.0156 0.021 0.057 0.0267 0.011 0.086
Cash liquidity (-1) -0.0126 0.141 -0.040 -0.0079 0.579 -0.021
Equity ratio (-1) -0.0129 0.326 -0.031 0.0027 0.910 0.005
Branching 0.0154 0.336 0.059 0.0060 0.817 0.019
Foreign share -0.0206 0.104 -0.050 0.0216 0.245 0.045
Public 0.0056 0.877 0.022 -0.0271 0.451 -0.087
Gold cover (-1) 0.1348 0.029 0.049 0.1213 0.072 0.059
Constant -0.0442 0.518 -- 0.0994 0.242 --
Total assets (-1) 0.0079 0.589 0.037 0.0106 0.261 0.053
Endorsement growth (-1) -0.1094 0.354 -0.139 -0.1196 0.020 -0.142
Endorsement growth (-2) -0.0613 0.448 -0.066 -0.0181 0.640 -0.024
Endorsement growth (-3) 0.0731 0.301 0.089 -0.0537 0.268 -0.066
Deposit growth (-1) 0.1098 0.407 0.035 0.2873 0.053 0.065
Deposit growth (-2) -0.0421 0.695 -0.015 0.1996 0.362 0.048
Deposit growth (-3) -0.1286 0.410 -0.038 0.1351 0.403 0.031
Share of bills (-1) 0.0197 0.484 0.057 0.0141 0.229 0.043
Cash liquidity (-1) 0.0213 0.637 0.039 -0.0329 0.139 -0.072
Equity ratio (-1) 0.0368 0.500 0.058 0.0347 0.261 0.058
Branching -0.0290 0.696 -0.074 0.0137 0.690 0.037
Foreign share 0.0140 0.766 0.024 -0.0526 0.036 -0.098
Public 0.0801 0.240 0.204 -0.0638 0.212 -0.172
Gold cover (-1) 0.5247 0.585 0.041 -0.0785 0.345 -0.038
Constant 0.9431 0.483 -- -0.3200 0.058 --
Select ...
Rho 0.039 0.823






No crisis, until July 1931 Crisis, until July 1931
No crisis, after July 1931 Crisis, after July 1931
Table A7: Robustness check for growth in endorsement liabilities ￿ Allowing for structural break
after July 1931.
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